The process is quite similar to the client secret flow described here, so be sure to take a look! The challenge here lies in generating a JWT (JSON Web Token) based on a certificate. I will provide a detailed explanation of how the JWT is generated and exchanged for an access token below.
The next authentication flow in my series will be the Client Credentials Flow. Be sure to check out the first one here! We will first take a look at the client secret model. I will skip the basics in this article as this has been explained in my other article.
When designing IaC modules finding the correct syntax to deploy a certain resource type is often not the hardest thing to do. What I found in 3 years of writing Bicep code, is that defining a dynamic way to name your resources which is also easy to use, seems to pose quite the challenge. This article won't define the best way to get this but a way that seems to work for me and the customers I have worked with in the past.
In April 2024, MITRE came with their new V15 version of ATT&CK. In this version a new sub-technique was introduced called 'T1556.009 - Modify Authentication Process: Conditional Access Policies'. This was, in my opinion, a great addition to the framework, since it is an important technique which can be abused by adversaries. By changing a Conditional Access policy (later referred to as 'CA policy'), an adversary can establish Credential Access, Defense Evasion, and Persistence in Entra ID. Since it is such a vital component, I thought it was time to do a bit of a deep dive into how we can detect and mitigate suspicious CA policy changes.
In the past, I was always curious about the workings of Connect-AzAccount, the authentication command from the Az.Accounts PowerShell module. This led me to delve into debugging, and the subsequent article is a product of that exploration. It's intriguing that both Az CLI and Az PowerShell are operational across all tenants, even the newly created ones. I aimed to emulate this functionality in PowerShell and utilize it in my scripts. For instance, this could be beneficial when executing commands across various tenants, a task that the Az modules are not adept at handling.
In a previous blog post I talked about how adversaries can exploit SSO capabilities of Hybrid or fully Entra ID joined devices. I mentioned the different ways we can steal tokens from the devices, either by using BrowserCore.exe or MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll.
